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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J O H N M. R A P P , dba R A P P 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. V Case No. 
SALT L A K E CITY, a municipal 
corporation; and M A R R I O T T 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
N A T U R E OF CASE 
This was an action by an unsuccessful bidder to re-
cover costs of preparing its bid. 
D I S P O S I T I O N OF CASE IN T R I A L COURT 
The court dismissed the action on motions without 
an evidentiary hearing. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal and remand for 
trial. 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
This case involves the bidding procedures followed 
by Salt Lake City in connection with a project for the 
construction and leasing of an "in-flight kitchen" at Salt 
Lake International Airport. The facts are as set out in 
the pleadings and affidavits. 
On or about November 30, 1972, the city entered 
into a "Lease and Concession Agreement" with Airline 
Foods, Inc., which is a subsidiary of defendant Marriott 
Corporation. 
Under the agreement Airline Foods leased from 
Salt Lake City real property at the Salt Lake Interna-
tional airport and was to operate the in-flight catering 
kitchen. The property involved was then vacant, but 
under the terms of the agreement Salt Lake City was to 
construct "at its expense" the necessary buildings for the 
kitchen, in accordance with plans and specifications pre-
pared by Airline Foods. But the city's expense was lim-
ited by the following provision: 
"Lessor shall pay for the 'cost of the project.' 
Provided that in the event the 'cost of the project' 
shall exceed the total sum of Five Hundred Fifty 
Thousand ($550,000) Dollars, the lessee shall 
promptly pay lessor upon demand the amount by 
2 
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which the "cost of the project' exceeds MI< n .>IJMI 
and which is the result of change orders and other 
amendments and supplements to the construction 
contract or contracts issued or executed by lessor 
at the written request of and approved by lessee. 
On i :>r about May I, 1078, Salt I iake City sen! to 
various construction contractors invitations for bids on 
the project. In response to the invitation for bid Rapp 
Construction Company submitted a bid for $648,888.00, 
compared with a preliminary estimate of $650,000.00 by 
Salt Lake City. 
The obligations of Airline Foods under the lease 
and concession agreements had been guaranteed by de-
fendant Marriott Corporation, and the concession and 
lease agreement contained an express provision that de-
fendant Marriott Corporation would be permitted to bid 
on all or any portion of the construction work. Although 
Marriott Corporation did not bid directly on the con-
struction project it submitted a bid through J.J .G. Con-
struction Company, a wholly owned subsidiary, in the 
amount of $540,000.00. Over the protest of Rapp, the 
second lowest bidder, the contract was awarded to J.J .G. 
Construction Company. 
There was nothing in the bidding documents sent 
out by Salt Lake City to give contractors notice of the 
agreement between S:»h l..*»k< iY;\ u . \\n nun cor-
poration and, for -\\\ ilu- rontractors knew, they were 
bidding on an equal basis with all other contractors u lu> 
were being asked to submit bids. 
3 
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It has been the consistent practice of the Salt Lake 
City Engineer's Office to publish a request for bids on 
all public improvement projects estimated to cost 
$12,000.00 or more, regardless of whether the funds 
were general city funds or special city funds. 
A comparison of the Salt Lake City's estimated cost 
of the project, the bid of J .J .G. Construction, and the 
other bids, suggests that the invitation for bids in this 
case was not an attempt to obtain competitive prices in 
the public interest, but was for the purpose of assisting 
Airline Foods in limiting its liability under the provision 
of the contract which required Salt Lake City to pay the 
cost of the project only up to $550,000.00. The amount 
of J.J.G.'s bid being just $10,000.00 below the liability 
limit and $110,000.00 below the estimate, the invitation 
for bids must have been issued for the purpose of giving 
an appearance that the competitive bidding was in the 
interest of Salt Lake City. 
Particular corporate entities being disregarded, the 
lessee and lessor entered into a construction contract for 
a project the plans and specifications for which were 
prepared by the lessee. Change orders had to be ap-
proved by the city and the lessee. 
There was no way in which other bidders could 
compete on an equal basis with J .J .G. Construction 
Company, but they were given no intimation of their 
competitive disadvantage. Because of the appearance of 
legitimacy, the other bidders went to great expense in 
preparing and submitting bids on the project. I t is his 
4 
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expense in the preparation of a bid that the plaintiff 
seeks to recover in this action. 
The court however summarily dismissed the action 
without hearing evidence. 
I 
IN A D V E R T I S I N G F O R BIDS A MUNICI -
P A L I T Y W A R R A N T S T H A T BIDS A R E 
S O U G H T I N GOOD F A I T H A N D F O R P U B -
L I C P U R P O S E S . 
This case is one of first impression in Utah, but is a 
first cousin of cases holding that public bodies may be 
held liable for expenses if the bidding procedure is 
tainted. 
The doctrine that advertising for bids obligates the 
advertising party to fairly consider all bids is enunciated 
in the landmark case of Heyer Products Co. v. United 
States, 140 F.Supp. 409, 135 Ct.Cl. 63 (1956) and has 
been faithfully adhered to by the U.S. Court of Claims 
ever since. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit has adopted the principle that a prima facie show-
ing of arbitrary or capricious consideration of bids by an 
agency will entitle an unsuccessful bidder to a hearing. 
Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 137 U.S. App.D.C. 
371, 424 F.2d 859 (1970); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Cla-
fee, 147 U.S. App. D.C. 238, 455 F.2d 1306 (1971) ; M. 
Steinthal <§ Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S. App. D.C. 221, 
5 
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455 F.2d 1289 (1971); Blackhawk Heating % Plumbing 
Co. v. Driver, 140 U.S. App. D.C. 31, 433 F.2d 1137 
(1970); Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 140 U.S.App. 
D.C. 98, 28 L.Ed.2d 234, 433 F.2d 1204 (1970), cert, 
denied, 401 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct 1186 (1971) ; Simpson 
Electric Co. v. Seamans, 317 F . Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 
1970) ; Keco Industries v. Laird, 318 F.Supp. 1361 
(D.D.C. 1970). The Scanwell court noted that even in 
the absence of a statute providing for it, a showing of 
arbitrariness will entitle plaintiff to a hearing. 
The Court of Claims has incorporated the language 
of Scanwell in its criteria for determining fairness in 
considering bids. Keco Industries v. United States, 428 
F.2d 1233, 192 Ct.Cl. 773 (1970). A bidder who estab-
lishes that the government has acted arbitrarily and ca-
priciously in awarding a bid to another is entitled to re-
cover costs incurred in preparing his bid. 
The Heyer case involved a situation where the con-
tract was awarded to a contractor whose bid was higher 
than those of six other bidders. The plaintiff alleged that 
he was the lowest responsible bidder, and that the Ord-
nance Tank Automotive Center acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in warding a contract to supply circuit test-
ers to another. The plaintiff alleged that the following 
statute was violated: 
"All bids shall be publicly opened at the time 
and place stated in the advertisement. Award 
shall be made with reasonable promptness by 
written notice to that responsible bidder whose 
bid, conforming to the invitation for bids, will be 
6 
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most advantageous to the Government, price and 
other factors considered: Provided, that all bids 
may be rejected when the agency head deter-
mines that it is in the public interest so to do." 41 
U.S.C.A. §152. [Emphasis added] 
The court went on to point out that the public only 
rather than an unsuccessful bidder had standing to con-
test the award of the contract. But this does not leave 
the wronged bidder without a remedy. 
The Court said: 
"The advertisement for bids was, of course, a 
request for offers to supply the things the Ord-
nance Department wanted. It could accept or re-
ject an offer as it pleased and no contract resulted 
until an offer was accepted. Hence, an unsuccess-
ful bidder cannot recover the profit he would 
have made out of the contract, because he had no 
contract. 
"But this is not to say that he may not recover 
the expense to which he was put in preparing his 
bid. 
"It was an implied condition of the request for 
offers that each of them would be honestly con-
sidered and that that offer which in the honest 
opinion of the contracting officer was most ad-
vantageous to the Government would be accept-
ed. No person would have bid, at all if he had 
known that 'the cards were stacked against him! 
No bidder would have put out $7,000 in prepar-
ing its bid as plaintiff says it did, if it had known 
the Ordnance Department had already deter-
mined to give the contract to the Weidenhoff 
Company. It would not have put in a bid unless 
it thought it was to be honestly considered. I t had 
7 
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a right to think it would be. The Ordnance De-
partment impliedly promised plaintiff it would 
be. This is what induced it to spend its money to 
prepare its bid. 
"The OTAC knew it would involve consider-
able expense to prepare models, photographs, 
diagrams and specifications and other things nec-
essary to comply with the invitation, and so, when 
it invited plaintiff to incur this expense, it must 
necessarily be implied that it promised to give 
fair and impartial consideration to its bid, having 
in mind only the interest of the Government and 
not the interest of some favorite bidder. 
"That promise was broken, shamefully brok-
en, if plaintiff's petition states the facts. If the 
facts there stated are true, the conclusion seems 
inescapable that the Ordnance Department knew 
from the beginning they were going to give Wei-
denoff the contract. The advertisement for bids 
was a sham, done only to appear to comply with 
the law, to clothe their apparently dishonest pur-
pose with the habiliments of legality. If these 
allegations are true, they practiced a fraud on 
plaintiff and on all other innocent bidders. They 
induced them to spend their money to prepare 
their bids on the false representation that their 
bids would be honestly considered. 
"This implied contract has been broken, and 
plaintiff may maintain an action for damages for 
its breach." [Emphasis added] 
Although there was no contract for materials until 
the bid was accepted, there was a collateral implied con-
tract that all bids would be given fair consideration. 
In Keco Industries v. United States, 428 F.2d 
1233, 192 Ct.Cl. 773 (1970), an unsuccessful bidder 
8 
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brought an action against the government. The court 
denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, hold-
ing that a bidder who can make a prima facie showing of 
arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the Gov-
ernment has standing to sue, and may recover the costs 
of preparing his bid upon proof of such action. 
Referring to the Heyer case, the court found that 
its holding was not intended to be limited to situations 
involving intentional fraud. The court said: 
"Instead we find that Heyer stated a broad gen-
eral rule which is that every bidder has the right 
to have his bid honestly considered by the gov-
ernment, and if this obligation is breached, then 
the injured party has the right to come into court 
to try and prove his cause of action." 428 F.2d 
1233, 1237. 
The court in Armstrong § Armstrong, Inc. v. 
United States, 356 F.Supp. 514 (D.C.E.D. Wash. 
1973) adopted the Court of Claims rule: 
"In actions for damages allegedly incurred be-
cause of arbitrary or capricious or otherwise un-
lawful acts or omissions by administrative agency 
procurement officials the Court of Claims has 
evolved a rule that applies to all procurement sit-
uations. This is, each request for offers to con-
tract with the federal government have as an im-
plied condition that each offer received will be 
fairly and honestly considered. When a prima 
facie case of arbitrariness or capriciousness has 
been established, a claimant will be allowed to 
present nonfrivolous claims." 
In Continental Business Enterprises, Inc. v. Unit-
ed States, 452 F.2d 1016 (Ct.Cl. 1971), the court denied 
% 
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a motion for summary judgment, finding that there was 
a sufficient factual dispute to raise an inference of arbi-
trary and capricious action on the part of the Govern-
ment. 
After recognizing the heavy burden of proof which 
the plaintiff must meet, the court said: 
"Our decision in Keco was premised at least in 
part on the feeling that aggrieved bidders have 
the right to require the Government to enforce 
the statutes and regulations fairly and honestly, 
either by seeking equitable relief in the Federal 
district courts or by suing for money damages 
here. 
"In requesting that we reconsider our holding 
in Keco, defendant asserts that permitting suits 
such as the present one could create serious prob-
lems in maintaining a smooth and effective pro-
curement system. We have not been told what 
these problems will be, but we doubt that our 
holding today will jeopardize the procurement 
process. Certainly, a suit for damages in this 
court after the completion of the contract will not 
disrupt the procurement process as much as an 
injunction issued before the contract is awarded. 
M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, supra. Moreover, 
the standard of proof which we require in cases 
such as this will undoubtedly discourage frivolous 
lawsuits and we do not think that contracting of-
ficers will feel intimidated or harassed by a rul-
ing which requires their agencies to pay damages 
to a contractor when it is established that he has 
sustained a loss as a result of arbitrary and capri-
cious action by the procurement officials." 
10 
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The statute referred to in Heyer, provided that all 
bids might be rejected, hence the solicitation of bids was 
not a promise to accept the lowest or best bid. 
But we are talking about two different contracts. 
The promise to give fair consideration—the promise that 
competitive bids are indeed being sought—is not affect-
ed by such a statute; and the promise is supported by 
consideration: the bidder's time, effort, and expense in 
preparing the bid. 
Referring to the statutory right to reject any or all 
bids, 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1966 
Rev.) §29.77 states: 
"In exercising the power to reject any or all 
bids, and preceeding anew with the awarding of 
the contract, the officers cannot act arbitrarily or 
capriciously but must observe good faith and ac-
cord to all bidders just consideration, thus avoid-
ing favortism, abuse of discretion, or corruption. 
Even where the right to reject any and all bids is 
properly reserved, the bidding law may not be 
evaded under the color of a rejection. Although 
the courts generally will not disturb an honest 
exercise of discretion, it has been said that they 
will intervene to prevent the arbitrary rejection 
of a bid when its effect is to defeat the object to 
be attained by competition." [Emphasis added] 
The Heyer case recognizes that the implied contract 
to give fair consideration to all bids does not rest upon 
the statutory obligation to award a contract to the bidder 
whose bid is most advantageous to the government. The 
gravamen of the court's opinion is that it is the act of ad-
vertising for bids which creates the obligation to give fair 
11 
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and impartial consideration, rather than the statutory 
duty to award the contract to the best bidder. 
I I 
A CITY MAY BE BOUND BY AN I M P L I E D 
CONTRACT. 
In the court below, Salt Lake City contended that 
there can be no implied contract with it without compli-
ance with statutory formalities, relying upon §24-1-15 
Revised Ordiances of Salt Lake City, which in pertinent 
part reads as follows: 
". . . that no liability against Salt Lake City in 
excess of one hundred fifty dollars shall be creat-
ed by the commissioner of any statutory depart-
ment without the sanction of the board of com-
missioners first had and approved . . . except as 
herein provided, no person shall create any liabil-
ity against the City." 
But in this case, presumably, the advertising for 
bids was approved by the board; and it is that act that 
gives rise to the implied contract. 
In 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, §975, it is 
said: 
"Notwithstanding some broad judicial state-
ments that a municipal corporation cannot be 
made liable as can private individuals, in rela-
tions quasi ex contractu, and the principles of law 
regarding an implied contract arising from the 
rendition of services or quantum meruit are with-
out application in dealing with municipalities, it 
is generally considered that a municipal corpora-
12 
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tion may become liable on an implied contract 
within the scope of its corporate powers, where 
the contract is deduced by inference from corpo-
rate acts, without note, deed, or writing, or is a 
quasi contract or contract implied in law. 
# # # 
''Recovery on an implied contract has been 
allowed in cases of informal renewals of intra 
vires contracts, and in cases of intra vires con-
tracts which are invalidated by the illegality of 
the consideration therefor, or by defects or irreg-
ularities in the making or execution of the con-
tract, such as failure to comply with constitution-
al, charter, or statutory requirements." 
* * * 
"It is not always necessary to recovery that 
benefits shall have been received; recovery in the 
case of a contract set aside for irregularity may 
be had for reasonable cost and expense incurred 
in the prosecution of the contract before it became 
the subject of attack irrespective of any benefit 
derived therefrom." 
In 10 McQuillan, Municipal Corporation (1966 
Rev.) §29.112, it is stated: 
"There is considerable authority however, to 
support the rule that a recovery may be allowed 
in such cases [where statutes prescribing the 
method of binding a municipality by contract 
have not been complied with] upon the theory 
that it is not justice, where a contract is entered 
into between a municipality and another, in good 
faith, and the corporation has received benefits 
thereunder, to permit the municipality to retain 
the benefits without paying the reasonable value 
13 
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therefor, the same as a private corporation or in-
dividual would have to do. * * *" 
That a municipality in the State of Utah may be 
bound by an implied contract is established in Salt Lake 
City v. State, 22 U.2d 37, 448 P.2d 350 (1968), in which 
the court found that the conduct of the parties evidenced 
a contract between Salt Lake City and the Territory 
for the City to provide free water to the territory 
in consideration of its locating the State Capitol in Salt 
Lake City. 
There apparently was no integrated agreement to 
provide water, but the court implied such an agreement 
from the conduct of the parties: 
"The actual agreements reached by and between 
the two bodies politic must be determined from a 
consideration of all of the documents available 
together with the understanding of the parties as 
was manifested by what was done in connection 
therewith." 448 P.2d 350, 355. 
The implied contract was enforced in spite of §1774, 
Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, vol. I, which provided 
that the city recorder: 
" . . . shall countersign all contracts made in be-
half of the city, and every contract made in behalf 
of the city or to which the city is a party shall be 
void unless signed by the recorder." 
CONCLUSION 
The right of unsuccessful bidders to maintain an 
action to recover the costs of preparing their bids in 
14 
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instances where there is a showing of arbitrariness and 
capriciousness in the advertising for, and in the con-
sideration of bids, has been recently recognized and 
is gaining support. 
In a time when integrity in government is coming 
under severe scrutiny it is encumbent upon the judiciary 
to guard against governmental, as well as private law-
lessness. If the lower court's decision is left to stand, 
the effect will be that any governmental agency may, 
at time, enter into secret agreements with favorite 
bidders, thereby determining in advance the outcome 
of what appears to be competitive bidding, but is in fact, 
mere artifice and pretense. 
The case of Thatcher Chemical Co. v. Salt Lake 
City Corporation, 21 U.2d 355, 445 P.2d 769 (1968), 
perhaps best sums up the dangers which exist when com-
petitive bidding is made a sham as in the case at bar. 
"The purpose of the system of competitive 
bidding tends to invite competition, to guard 
against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, 
fraud and corruption in the awarding of munici-
pal contracts, and to secure the best work or sup-
plies at the lowest price practicable, and such a 
system is designed for the benefit of the citizens 
and taxpayers and the public interest generally." 
The public interest, referred to in Thatcher, can 
best be vindicated in cases such as the one at bar by 
holding, as in Curtiss-W right Corporation v. McLucas, 
364 F.Supp. 750 (D.C.N J . 1973), that plaintiff shall 
have standing to advance the public interest as a private 
attorney general. 
15 
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I t is admitted in the pleadings that the Marriott 
subsidiary, Airline Foods Incorporated, was obligated 
by a "Lease and Concession Agreement" with Salt 
Lake City to absorb the cost of the in-flight kitchen in 
any sum by which it exceeded $550,000. If plaintiff's 
contentions are true that the City estimated the project's 
cost at $650,000 and the Marriott subsidiary, J .J .G. 
Construction Company, submitted a bid of $540,000.00, 
the implication is almost irresistible that Marriott's bid 
was based solely upon its contractual liability in the lease 
and concession agreement rather than upon any esti-
mated cost. 
And if, as the plaintiff contends, Salt Lake City 
failed to disclose the fact of the above agreement to 
prospective bidders, thereby giving warning of Mar-
riott's competitive advantage, the inference that the 
outcome of the bidding was all but predetermined is 
likewise irresistible. 
These are facts which the plaintiff seeks to litigate 
in the trial court. Upon the basis of the authority herein 
set forth, he should be afforded that opportunity. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
Roe and Fowler 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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